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Turkish Trade Unions and the
European Boomerang 
Zeynep Alemdar
1 The well-known literature on the transnational linkages between domestic actors and
international organizations argues that domestic groups that are repressed by their
states would seek international allies to help them affect their states’ policies in favor
of their own agenda. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) ‘boomerang effect’ and Risse-Kappen,
Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) ‘spiral model’ explain this process wherein domestic NGOs
reach out to and lobby international allies who then put pressure on the repressive
state, which in turn transforms its policy towards the domestic actors. Through their
interactions  with  international  allies,  domestic  actors  thus  contribute  to  the
socialization  of  their  states  as a  ‘member  of  the  international  community  in  good
standing’ (Risse-Kappen 1999: 530). 
2 Both the boomerang and the spiral  models  explain  the  level  of  interconnectedness
between domestic and international politics, and trace a framework that helps us study
the transnational interactions between different actors in all their complexity. These
models aim to provide a framework for comparison. However, their explanations of
domestic actor behaviors, while understandable and useful for generalization, prevent
us from understanding the changing dynamics of relations between domestic actors,
international organizations, and the state. 
3 Both  models  employ  a  ‘weak/strong’  dichotomy  to  explain  the  domestic  actors’
position within the national realm and classify states in two groups, repressive and
democratic.  This  study  argues  that  we  need  to  go  beyond  these  dichotomist
assumptions  in  order  to  better  understand  the  nature  of  these  relations.  Domestic
actors  within  limited  political  opportunity  structures  would  rationally  seek
international support to strengthen their own policy positions and garner support for
the  realization  of  their  aims,  but  this  process  and  the  environment  in  which  they
function cannot be taken as static, since national and international developments and
their interrelationships affect internal environment, influencing the actors’ behaviors
and their interest and preference formations. Domestic actors’ interactions with their
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‘international allies’  depend on how they perceive the international ally.  Therefore,
this  research  postulates  that  first,  the  more  domestic  organization  sees  the
international organization’s issues as salient to itself, the more likely it is to appeal to
the latter. Second, defining domestic actors as weak since they have limited political
opportunities is necessary yet not a sufficient explanation of domestic actors’ position
within the national realm. One has to understand to what extent this limitation works
and when can the domestic actors resort to international allies. It will be impossible for
a domestic organization with no access or no legal right to appeal to an international
ally.  Thus,  understanding  the  different  levels  of  closeness  is  important.  This  paper
argues  that,  despite  the  literature’s  claims  that  the  closed  environments  are  more
likely  to  induce  domestic  actors  to  resort  to  the  international  arena,  domestic
organization appeal to international organization depends on the liberalization level of
the domestic environment. 
4 This  research  investigates  the  interactions  between  Turkish  trade  unions  and  the
European Union, which, according to the boomerang and spiral models, should be an
excellent case in point. In the Turkish case, given that the Turkish foreign policy goal of
full  membership  to  the  EU  is  more  than  six  decades  old,  and  the  EU  strongly
emphasizes the need for more democratic rules and norms for the candidate states, one
would  say  that  the  EU  would  be  the  perfect  leverage  tool  for  those  domestic
organizations.  The  Europeanization  literature  posits  that  domestic  actors  gain  new
resources  during  the  EU  membership  processes,  and  this  process  brings  about  a
redistribution of power among the domestic actors (Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso
2001:  11).  It  is  thus  expected  that  domestic  actors  use  Europeanization  as  an
opportunity to further their goals. 
5 Further, since the Turkish-EU relations has a long history that covers the whole period
of EU’s enlargements and ‘deepening’, as well as Turkey’s tumultuous political history
of three (and a half) military- coups, and an important number of government changes,
this case can account for the time dimension mired in the hypotheses above. 
6 Through  structured-focused  interviews  with  trade  unionists,  EU  and  Turkish
government officials, primary, secondary and archival data, research on Turkish trade
unions’  interactions  with  the  EU  shows  that  labor  organizations’  use  of  the  EU  as
leverage tool depends mostly on the domestic organization’s specifics. Although the
literature  expects  them to  appeal  to  the EU for  better  labor  standards  or  workers’
rights  Turkish  domestic  actors’  use  of  the  EU  depends  heavily  on  the  domestic
environment and their respective EU perceptions. 
7 This article thus focuses on the domestic factors that affect the boomerang and spiral
models’ success or failure in explaining the domestic actors’ appeal to international
organizations.  It  explains the reasons why, contrary to the expectations of the well
known literature, Turkish domestic organizations do not appeal to the EU as often as
expected, and why they do not use the EU discourse effectively to change state policies.
8 Doing  so  provides  us  with  important  insights  that  improve  our  understanding  of
domestic organizations’ interactions with their states and international organizations.
What  are  the  reasons  behind  a  domestic  actors’  appeal  to  an  international
organization? What are the particularities of employee groups studied here that can
inform us about other domestic groups, and for similar groups in different countries? 
9 The paper first presents a brief survey of the transnational literature that explains the
interactions between domestic groups and international organizations. It then focuses
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on  how  the  literature’s  expectations  concerning  the  reasons  why  domestic
organizations  appeal  to  international  organizations  are  not  completely  met  in  the
Turkish case. In the conclusion, the paper raises some questions that contribute to our
understanding of domestic-international organization interactions. 
 
I. Transnational Literature: Boomerangs and Spirals 
10 The  transnational  literature  on  advocacy  networks argues  that  these  organizations
appeal  to  international  organizations  (IOs)  in  order  to  alter  the  behaviors  of  their
states. In their boomerang model, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 12-13) assess: 
...domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly seek out international allies to try
to bring pressure on their states from outside. This is most obviously the case in
human  rights....On  other issues...[NGOs’]  international  contacts  can  amplify  the
demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo back
these demands into the domestic arena.
11 The spiral  model,  a more developed version of  the boomerang model,  explains  the
complex interplay between the external mobilization, the target state’s policy choices,
and  domestic  opposition  against  repression.  The  spiral  model  explains  a  five-stage
process.  First,  activists  take  the  issue  to  the  international  realm,  disseminating
information about the human rights violations and lobbying the Western states and IOs
to  pressure  the  state.  The  repressive  state  dismisses  the  complaints  as  unjustified.
Advocacy  networks  go  on  to prove  and  justify  their  case,  pointing  out  the  state’s
intentional violation of internationally recognized moral standards. The Western states
or the IOs put more pressure on the repressive government, which cannot insist on
denial, partly because of their need and desire to be a ‘civilized state’, and a member of
the  international  community  in  good  standing  (Risse  1999:  530).  The  level  of  state
repression declines and opposition groups, which were previously deterred, mobilize.
The target state under pressure from both above and below not only stops repression
but  is  forced to  set  up domestic  institutions  to  implement  international  normative
standards (Hasenclever 2005: 64). 
12 Both models  stress  that  domestic  actors  use  transnational  networks  since  they  are
suppressed in their own societies. They argue those domestic actors who have limited
or no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas interact with IOs. Risse (2002:
267) finds also that transnational  activities of  human rights groups are particularly
effective in inducing policy change when ‘domestic groups in the repressive state are
too  weak  or  too  oppressed  to  constitute  a  serious  challenge  to  the  regime’.
Transnationalist  scholars  thus  posit  that  domestic  actors,  who  do  not  possess  the
nationally institutionalized mechanisms to have a say in their state's policies, are more
likely to prefer to take the issue to the international level. Weak domestic actors see an
advantage in turning to the international organizations since IOs can be more powerful
in terms of inducing changes in state behavior. They do omit, however, that domestic
actors’  interaction  with  an  international  ally  is  also  usually  at  the  hands  of  state
officials who control the domestic actors. If for example, domestic actors are in jail, are
denied passports, or are forbidden to have interactions with “foreigners” then how are
they going to interact with an international ally, let alone use the ally as a legitimate
‘stick’ against the government? The paper thus tries to refine this hypothesis arguing
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that  an  environment’s  closeness  should  be  better  explained-  using  the  term
liberalization of the domestic environment. 
13 Moreover, the ‘repressive-oppressive state’ and ‘weak domestic actor’ definitions are
insufficient  to  explain  the  reasons  for  the  domestic  organizations’  appeal  or  to
elaborate the reasons for their effectiveness. The ‘repressive-oppressive state’ variable
limits research on domestic-international organization interaction to underdeveloped
countries, or authoritarian states, and to specific time periods, thereby neglecting the
evolution of a state-regime over time.1 Introducing the time dimension to research,
however, gives us the ability to move with the reality of dynamic factors (Heclo 1972,
93). 
 
II. The Turkish Case
14 This research investigates three important trade union confederations in Turkey and
their relations with the EU since Turkey’s first application to the EU’s predecessor, the
EC, in 1959 until  2005.  It  traces Turkey’s political  scene from the 1960s’  more open
domestic context to 1980s’ military rule and to the post-1999 EU process. Within this
period,  especially  after  the  1980  military  coup,  Turkish  trade  unions  have  been
particularly repressed. Since their rights are better protected in the EU system, and
given that Turkey’s will for EU membership is solid (despite some disruptions between
the parties and the Turkish foreign policy establishment’s internal conflicts during the
early years), it is expected that these groups would appeal to the EU in order to change
state policies. Findings suggest, however, that these organizations’ appeal to the EU is
highly dependent on the domestic context. They do appeal to the EU, but their appeal is
highly dependent on their organizational traits, and they can actually use the EU in a
negative  way,  expressing opposition to  EU membership  in  order  to  appeal  to  their
constituents. 
15 In order to apply the boomerang and spiral models to the Turkish case properly, and to
compare the organizations’ relations with the EU, this paper draws a framework for
these organizations’ appeals to the EU based on Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) model. Keck
and  Sikkink  (1998:  25)  summarize  the  goals  of  transnational  activists  under  five
categories: to get an issue on the international agenda, to get actors to change their
discursive positions, to change institutional processes, to influence policy change, and
to influence actor behavior. Based on their framework, this paper argues that domestic
groups may appeal to international organizations in three ways. First, they can use the
IO in their discourse to raise public awareness for issues that they are interested in and
to attempt to convince both government officials and the general public to support
their own policy positions. Second, domestic groups can lobby the IOs to put pressure
on the state. By mobilizing outside pressure, they can strengthen their own lobbying
activities directed towards the state.  Third, they can even use this to become more
influential  players  in  decision-making  processes  that  are  of  interest  to  them.  The
appeal  to  IOs  can  thus  be  grouped  under  three  broad  headings:  agenda-setting,
lobbying to push for policy change, and changing institutional procedures. 
16 When the organization mentions the EU when calling upon the government to make a
change  in  its  policy  at  a  press  conference  or  through  a  press  release  or  other
publication,  this  act  is  categorized  as  agenda-setting.  When  a  member  of  the
organization  presents  the  organization’s  views  directly  to  state  officials,  then  the
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appeal is in the form of lobbying. When a representative of the organization voices his
views in a decision/ policy making institution, then it is appealing to the EU within
institutional procedures and thus influencing these procedures.
17 The  paper  looks  at  Confederation  of  Turkish  Trade  Unions  [Türkiye  İşçi  Sendikaları
Konfederasyonu,  TÜRK-İŞ],  Confederation  of  Revolutionary  Trade  Unions  [Türkiye
Devrimci  İşçi  Sendikaları  Konfederasyonu,  DİSK],  and  Confederation  of  Justice  Seekers’
Trade Unions (HAK-İŞ). The research makes use of structured in-depth interviews with
civil society representatives, government and EU officials, as well as with scholars who
work with or specialized in Turkish civil society. The paper also uses primary sources
on  the  historical  background  and  the  more  recent  activities  of  civil  society
organizations in Turkey. Interviewees have supplied numerous folders, brochures and
documents about their own organizations and sometimes even fax messages that they
have  exchanged  with  other  officials.  There  is  also  an  emerging  literature  on  civil
society in Turkey. The Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey publishes the
proceedings, discussions and conclusions of civil society symposia that it initiated in
December 1994 in a series of books. Different Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as
the Third Sector Foundation and the Civil Society Development Center prepare reports
and working papers on associational life in Turkey. 
 
Turkey’s Domestic Environment and the EU
18 Becoming a member of the European Union has been a fundamental issue in Turkish
politics  and  daily  life  for  more  than  four  decades.  In  1963  when  Turkey  and  the
European Community signed the Association Agreement (Ankara Treaty),  Turks saw
this as an opportunity to enter the gates of Europe; Europe symbolized the Western
civilization that was to be attained according to the Turkish modernization project.
Despite the ruptures,  interruptions,  and fluctuations in the Turkish-EU relationship
over the years, the EU has been seen as the international force that catalyzes Turkey’s
march towards the West and towards modernity, which, in Turkish political jargon,
seem to be equal to democratization.
19 The EU’s role as a vehicle for the democratization of Turkey has been widely discussed.
Since  1987,  the  Turkish  state’s  attempts  to  liberalize  the  domestic  environment,
severely closed due to the 1980 military coup, have mostly coincided with European
demands. Turkish governments have passed nine major political reform packages that
provided for a considerable opening up of the Turkish political environment since the
Helsinki Summit, in which the EU announced Turkey as a candidate for membership. In
2005, accession negotiations that serve to harmonize Turkish laws with European laws
started. Thus, if we were going to agree with the transnationalist literature’s argument
that repressed domestic groups tend to search for an international ally who could put
pressure on the state, the EU would appear to be the ideal such ally. 
20 In case of the trade unions, after the 1980 coup all but one trade union confederations
were disbanded and their leaders were taken into custody. Additional restrictions on
freedom of speech, right to assembly and demonstration, and methods of financing
limited  the  employee  organizations  in  every  aspect  of  their  activities.  Despite  the
criticisms of the EU’s social policy, it is clear that European provisions for trade unions
and workers’ rights are far better than the Turkish ones. It therefore seems logical to
suggest that as soon as the domestic organizations could find ways to interact with
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international organizations when not restricted by law, they would have used the EU as
leverage against the Turkish state. 
 
Trade Union Confederations in Turkey
21 Arguing  that  increased  liberalization  of  the  domestic  environment  is  important  in
domestic actors’ interaction with international organizations,and the more domestic
organization sees the international organization’s issues as salient to itself, the more
likely it is to appeal to the latter, the paper traces the trade unions’ interaction with the
EU. Employee organizations in Turkey include three confederations of trade unions,
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions [Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları  Konfederasyonu, TÜRK-
İŞ],  Confederation  of  Revolutionary  Trade  Unions  [Türkiye  Devrimci  İşçi  Sendikaları
Konfederasyonu,  DİSK],  and Confederation of  Justice  Seekers’  Trade Unions  (HAK-İŞ),
bringing  together  a  total  of  56  unions,  representing  61  percent  of  the  unionized
workforce in Turkey.  TÜRK-İŞ  is  the oldest  and the largest  confederation,  and it  is
known to be close to the centrist parties in the governments. DİSK is the trade union
confederation of the left. HAK-İŞ, emerging from an Islamist background, defines itself
with  its  commitment  to  ‘moral  values  and  justice’  which  interjects  a  conservative
character  to  the  confederation.  It  has  close  relationships  with  the  Justice  and
Development Party (AKP), which holds the majority in the parliament since 2002 and
comes from the same Islamist traditions. Table 1 presents a comparison of these three
organizations. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Employee Organizations 
 
Confederation  of










To  solve  the  nation’s
workers’  problems  in
cooperation  with  but
independent  from  the
government
To  promote  the  social  and
democratic  rights  of  the
working class independently
from  political  parties,
owners  of  capital  and  the
state
To  value  humanism,
localism,  nationalism,
moral  values,  law  and
justice  while  promoting
the rights of workers
Type 
Confederation  of  trade
unions
Confederation  of  labor
unions
Confederation  of  trade
unions
Membership Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary
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European  Trade  Union
Confederations (ETUC),
The  EU-Turkey  Joint
Consultative  Economic
and  Social  Committee**,





The  EU-Turkey  Joint
Consultative  Economic  and
Social  Committee,  The
Economic and Social Council
ETUC,  The  EU-Turkey
Joint  Consultative
Economic  and  Social
Committee, The Economic
and Social Council 
* The confederations’ sizes proved to be a problematic issue since the statistics are based on the
numbers that the trade unions provide. It is the conventional understanding that confederations
inflate the number of their members, thus the table includes the number of trade unions belonging to
each confederation. 
** This Committee serves to facilitate the involvement of the economic and social partners (the
employers and employees associations as well as public professional organizations) in the process of
consolidating the Turkish- EU relations.
22 TÜRK-İŞ was founded in 1952, as a part of the corporatist structure supported by the
ruling parties  of  the time (Tokol  1994:  34).  When the 1961 Constitution granted all
workers the right to form unions, and recognized their right to collective bargaining
and strikes, TÜRK-İŞ  was granted a representational monopoly at the national level,
undermining its rivals even in those areas where the latter had already organized the
greatest number of workers (Sakallıoğlu 1991: 57). The state affected the selection of
TÜRK-İŞ  leaders  as  well,  thereby  intervening  in  the  confederation’s  internal
governance. 
23 DİSK was the main rival to TÜRK-İŞ  during the late 1960s and 1970s. DİSK’s socialist
representatives  criticized  TÜRK-İŞ  for  its  loyalty  to  governments,  and  for  adopting
‘American’  style  collective  bargaining.  The  third  confederation,  HAK-İŞ,  was  not  a
major player in Turkish politics until the 1990s. 
24 The 1982 Constitution that the military government enacted restricted the activities of
trade unions as with all other types of civil society. Because of their linkages with the
radically  politicized  groups  that  created  the  violence  of  late  1970s,  all  trade  union
confederations  except  TÜRK-İŞ  were  shut  down.  DİSK  suffered  from  the  military
measures most. Given that it was a strong political force on the left of the political
spectrum during the 1970s, the military government dismantled the confederation, and
subjected DİSK representatives to trial on the grounds that they attempted to demolish
the constitutional regime. Furthermore, the Constitution banned the trade unions (and
their confederations) from political involvement. 
25 The new laws stipulated that unions ‘shall not pursue political cause, engage in political
activity, receive support from political parties or give support to them; nor shall take
joint actions with associations,  public professional organizations and foundations to
promote such aims’ (Özbudun 1991: 61). Apart from de-politicizing the trade unions,
the new Constitution gave the right to unionize only to workers, restricted the right to
strike, introduced a system of inspection for the activities of trade unions and founded
a  bureaucratic  establishment,  The  Supreme Board  of  Arbitration,  which  supervised
industrial relations and usurped the political bargaining power of trade unions.
26 One more blow to unions’  bargaining power came with the setting up of  the State
Collective  Agreement  Coordination  Committee,  later  reconstituted  into  the  Public
Employers  Association  affiliated  with  the  Turkish  Confederation  of  Employers
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Association  (TİSK).  TÜRK-İŞ  representatives  claimed  that  the  foundation  of  this
association only strengthened the government’s hold on industry-labor relations since
all of its members were public employees. In 1985, the government made a decision to
hire  public  sector  employees  on  contract,  which  made  public  employee  unionism
ineffective (Sakallıoğlu 1991: 62). These legal modifications led to the political exclusion
of organized working class (Barkey 1990: 189). 
27 Although during the 1990s changes to the 1982 Constitution have eased some of the
restrictions on the working class, labor’s exclusion from Turkish politics still continues.
The 1991 elections brought a new coalition government, consisting of the True Path
Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), into power. Both parties
stressed labor’s problems in their programs and promised that syndical rights would be
elevated to the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) standards. In the meantime the
Turkish Criminal Code, under which the trade unions were closed down and banned,
was changed and DİSK, the second largest trade union confederation, was reinstated
after a decade. After many strikes and attempts at entering into a dialogue with the
government,  organized  labor  managed  to  found  the  first  public  sector  employees’
union  in  1990  by  benefiting  from  a  lacuna  in  the  Constitution  which  does  not
specifically  ban public  sector  employees  from forming unions (Toprak 1996:  97).  In
1992, some unions of public sector employees came together and founded the Turkish
Public  Employees’  Unions  Confederation  (KAMU-SEN)  and  in  1995,  the  second
confederation  of  public  sector  employees unions,  Public  Laborers’  Unions
Confederation (KESK), was founded.2 
28 In the meantime, in 1994 Turkey’s fragile economy broke down. Supported by the IMF,
the  government  introduced  the  April  1994  stabilization  package  that  envisaged  a
radical expenditure cut, and a privatization program for the State Owned Enterprises
(SOE). The privatization of State Owned Enterprises threatened organized labor directly
since  the  majority  of  the  workers  belonging  to  trade  unions  worked  in  these
enterprises. 
29 In  addition  to  the  remaining  legal  restrictions  and  the  privatization  program,
diversification of the economy during the 1980s and 1990s affected Turkish labor. The
heavy industrial sector, which held organized labor together, lost its priority in the
economy. Workers in other sectors did not necessarily belong to unions. The number of
part-time workers, contractual workers, and service sector workers increased. Most of
these workers neither paid taxes, nor had social security pensions (Aydın 2004: 28). 
30 These changes necessitated a reevaluation of the trade union movement. The three big
trade union confederations started to change their once hostile positions towards each
other and started to cooperate on issues related to workers’ rights. For the first time in
1992, the big three confederations celebrated the May 1st Workers’ Day together. Their
cooperation  spread  to  other  areas  and  the  three  confederations  developed  the
‘Democracy  Platform’  in  1993,  which  later  turned  into  the  ‘Labor  Platform’.  These
Platforms were attempts  at  uniting different  parts  of  the civil  society  (trade union
confederations as well as some professional organizations) in order to put an end to the
political exclusion that all types of civil society associations had suffered since 1980. 
31 While the confederations cooperated on the general idea of freedom of labor, they had
diverse views on the issue of EU membership. The issue of EU membership, with its
influence on the psyche of the Turkish public in 1990s because of the unstable relations
Turkish Trade Unions and the European Boomerang
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 | 2009
8
and never-ending disputes over Turkey’s identity, provided the confederations with a
subject around which they could frame their own identity. 
32 In the meantime the Turkish government, in its efforts at fulfilling the Copenhagen
criteria  and  adopting  the  acquis of  the  EU,  started  working  towards  bringing  the
Turkish laws and practices in labor issues in line with the EU. Turkish governments
have been adopting some of the acquis and working on improving the social dialogue.
The  Economic  and  Social  Council,  which  brings  together  the  trade  union
confederations, employer organizations and government officials for consultation on
economic  and  social  policies,  was  founded  in  1995.  In  1996,  the  EU-Turkey  Joint
Consultative  Committee  was  launched.  This  Committee  serves  to  facilitate  the
involvement  of  the  economic  and  social  partners  (the  employers  and  employees
associations as well as public professional organizations) in the process of consolidating
Turkish- EU relations. Despite these, Turkey has been lacking in the area of improving
social  rights  as  well  as  adopting  the  acquis related  to  social  policy.  The  European
Commission’s evaluation reports point out that significant constraints remain on the
right to organize and the right to collective bargaining and conclude that Turkey still
falls short of ILO and EU standards.
33 The EU’s criticisms of Turkish laws and practices ought to logically lead Turkish labor
groups to renew their efforts for policy change. With the resources and the ability to
pressure the government, the confederations could use the EU as a tool to further their
interests.  The empirical  evidence on Turkish trade unions confederations,  however,
points to different patterns. Two out of three trade union confederations studied here
do not use the EU appeal as an instrument to push for better workers’ rights. Instead,
they use the EU to further their own organizational interests. What are the reasons? 
 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) and Its Relations with the
Turkish Government
34 The  Confederation  of  Turkish  Trade  Unions  (TÜRK-İŞ) is  the  largest  and  oldest
confederation of trade unions in Turkey. Thus, its relations with the government and
its stance towards the EU are illustrative of the state of labor representation in Turkey
as well as Turkish perceptions of EU relations. Over the course of TÜRK-İŞ’s history, we
see the inability of a labor movement to further its interests. While some blame this on
the organizations’ cooperative relations with the state since its inception, most trade-
unionists argue that it  is the discrepancy of interest between the members and the
ruling-elite of the confederation. Looking at the interaction of TÜRK-İŞ  with the EU
which pushes for better labor standards, we can agree with the latter view at large
although it needs refinement. TÜRK-İŞ appeals to the EU, negatively or positively, for
the specific interests of the organization rather than the rights of the workers as a
whole.  This  proves the hypothesis  that  the domestic  actors’  interactions with their
international  allies  depend  on  how  they  perceive  the  latter.  The  more  the
confederation sees the EU policies in line with its own policies, the more likely it is to
appeal to it. The second hypothesis, that liberalization of the environment is important
for the organization to establish and pursue relations with the international allies, and
use them as enforcers of their own position vis-à-vis their own state, is also proved by
the TÜRK-İŞ case as explained below. Yet, since TÜRK-İŞ was the least affected among
the  trade  unions  (in  terms  of  legal  restrictions)  following  the  1980  coup,  other
organizations’ positions would be more important for this hypothesis. The following
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section describes and evaluates how TÜRK-İŞ appeals to the EU in its agenda-setting,
and lobbying activities and how, via EU, it tries to change the institutional procedures
in Turkey. 
35 TÜRK-İŞ  brings  together  35  trade  unions  and  claims  to  have  1,179,983  members,
whereas insiders argue that a more accurate number of members is around 900,000
(Aker 2004). TÜRK-İŞ is financed by its membership fees which are taken directly out of
the workers’ pay checks (Tıraş 2004).
36 TÜRK-İŞ  is the oldest confederation and since its foundation it has kept cooperative
relations with the government. An ex-official in TÜRK-İŞ explains, ‘Trade unions were
founded when there was not any private sector in Turkey. So, TÜRK-İŞ had to work with
the government’ (Aker, 2004). TÜRK-İŞ, declaring its commitment to stay out of daily
politics,  is  ‘beyond party politics.’  This  motto,  according to some,  actually hurt  the
workers’ movement in Turkey since TÜRK-İŞ’s non-political stance was not attractive
to  all  trade  unions.  The  subsequent  fragmentation  and  polarization  of  new
confederations,  some  trade  unionists  argue,  reduced  the  strength  of  the  workers’
movement  as  a  whole  and  gave  way  to  the  perception  that  labor  was  actually
responsible for market distortions and for the inflation that had been ravaging the
country’s economy (Sakallıoğlu 1991: 59-60). 
37 The military government that came to power with the 1980 coup closed down the three
confederations that spawned from TÜRK-İŞ as well as some members of TÜRK-İŞ and
some other independent trade unions. TÜRK-İŞ as a confederation, however, supported
the coup and maintained a ‘policy of dialogue’ with the government, hoping that once
the military rule was over, the restrictions on the unions would be lifted. Contrary to
TÜRK-İŞ’s  hopes,  the civilian government of  the Motherland Party (ANAP) not only
kept the restrictions of the military rule but also introduced further limitations such as
recruiting public sector employees on contract instead of granting them the right of
collective bargaining. 
38 In addition to the Motherland Party’s (ANAP) dismissal of TÜRK-İŞ’s demands for over
six years,  a drastic decline in the purchasing power of the workers and an unequal
distribution of income spurred a new round of activism in the trade union movement at
the end of the 1980s (Sakallıoğlu 1991: 66-67). By late 1986, TÜRK-İŞ started to turn
against the government. It withdrew its support from the ruling party ANAP, and called
the  workers  to  go  on  strike,  using  a  ‘weapon’  whose  effectiveness  TÜRK-İŞ  had
questioned  since  1982  (Sakallıoğlu  1991:  63).  In 1987,  the  number  of  strikes
skyrocketed, from a total number of 21 strikes in 1985 and 1986 to 307 in 1987 (Tokol
1994:  127).  Not  all  of  these  strikes  were  organized  by  TÜRK-İŞ  alone,  but  the
Confederation  supported  the  strikes  launched  by  other  confederations  and  by
independent unions.
39 In 1988, the number of strikes in the private sector decreased, while the public sector
employees adopted new forms of ‘resistance’ protesting the state’s wage policies and
the prohibition against strikes. These new forms of resistance involved slowing down
the work, not working over-time, growing beards and the like (Sakallıoğlu 1991: 68).
Some amendments to the Labor Law were introduced and some of the restrictions on
labor unionism were lifted. The actual changes on the law were minimal, but they came
at a time when there was a general  wave of  loosening of  the Constitution that the
military rule had imposed on the country. 
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40 In 1990 and 1991 trade unions kept on protesting government policies and nation-wide
boycotts were held. TÜRK-İŞ, with the support of HAK-İŞ, called for a nation-wide daily
strike on January 3, 1991. A day later, 48,000 mine workers, who were unionized under
MADEN-  İŞ,  an  affiliate  to  TÜRK-İŞ,  started  to  walk  from  Zonguldak,  northwestern
Turkey, to the capital Ankara to ‘claim their right to workplace safety and collective
bargaining.’  The  ‘Grand  March  to  Ankara’  was  stopped  by  the  government  on  the
grounds that  the Gulf  crisis  had erupted and,  at  times of  national  security threats,
strikes  should  be  postponed.  Collective  bargaining  took  place  within  the  Supreme
Arbitration Board in 1992. The same year, TÜRK-İŞ went through a major change in its
management.  The  new  President,  Bayram  Meral,  increased  the  tone  of  criticisms
against the state’s privatization practices. 
41 TÜRK-İŞ  organizes  public  sector  employees.  Privatization  of  this  sector  would  cut
subsidies of the government and turn the state-owned enterprises to private capitalists.
TÜRK-İŞ clearly announced its desire for government control of the public sector in its
declaration of principles in 1995: 
‘The state should guide national economic development via democratic planning.
The state should actively intervene in the market, prioritizing the interests of the
country and the people. The state should not leave the market to the hands of the
national  and  foreign  monopolies  and  should  impede  big  companies  from
cooperating with each other to manage the market (Article 26)… On pricing the
products that are produced in the public sector (in the State Owned Enterprises),
the  principles  of  a  “Social  State”  should  be  applied.  Subventions,  subsidies  and
support-buyouts are the only ways in which the State can diminish the injustice in
the distribution of income (Article 58)’ (TÜRK-İŞ history).
42 TÜRK-İŞ’s opposition to the state’s privatization policies is explained in Article 39 of the
same document: 
‘State-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  constitute  a  primary  pillar  of  the  Turkish
Republic’s economic and political independence. These enterprises should not be
sold to local or foreign people or institutions within the framework of privatization.
Privatization is only a tool to de-unionize workers and enslave them… The SOEs
that  were  founded  to  benefit  some,  under  different  governments  and  with
inappropriate  technologies,  should  be  closed  or  sold  upon  consultation  with  a
democratic  Economic  and  Social  Council;  the  workers  who  serve  in  these
institutions  should  be  placed  into  other  public  enterprises.  Decisions  on
privatization should not be taken solely on the basis of the economic profitability of
the enterprise but also on the basis of its profitability to the local economy and the
local life there’ (TÜRK-İŞ history).
43 TÜRK-İŞ  rigorously  opposed  the  privatization  efforts  of  the  government.  The
Confederation,  arguing  that  the  privatization  policies  are  imposed  by  international
organizations, mainly the IMF and the EU, thus opposes these organizations and their
policies as they apply to Turkey. 
 
International Linkages, Relations with the EU
44 TÜRK-İŞ is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
and of the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC). In the turbulent years of the
mid-1950s when the new DP government was trying to establish a liberal economy, the
government  was  not  supportive  of  TÜRK-İŞ’s  demand  to  become  a  member  of  the
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international labor union organization, the ICFTU. After the ‘liberal’ coup of 1960 and
its noninterventionist 1961 Constitution, however, TÜRK-İŞ joined the ICFTU. 
45 At  the  time  of  Turkish  application  for  associate  membership  to  the  EC,  TÜRK-İŞ
supported the government’s policy. The confederation was already a member of the
ICFTU under its  European regional  group,  and with the formation of  the European
Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) in 1973, it became a member of the ETUC. Thus, by
the  early  1970s,  TÜRK-İŞ  was  a  regular  member  of the  international  trade  union
community. 
46 The fragmentation  and  radicalization  of  the  labor  movement  in  the  1970s  and the
tightening of state control on labor movements with the 1980 military coup, however,
hurt Turkish organized labor’s position in the international arena. TÜRK-İŞ’s support
for the 1980 coup stirred international criticism, and its membership in the European
confederation, the ETUC, was suspended. A former TÜRK-İŞ representative explains, ‘In
1980,  the  ETUC  was  opposed  to  the  Turkish  government  in  power  [military
government]. Because TÜRK-İŞ’s secretary general was a minister in that government,
our membership was suspended’ (Aker 2004). Aker (2004) further explains the reasons
for the breakdown of the relationships, 
‘During the foundation of the ETUC, which was actually spun out of the ICFTU, we
were  already  a  member  of  the  European bloc.  Europe  was  not  interested  in  us
though.  We  were  always  the  “outsiders.”  Our  areas  of  interest  and  technical
problems did  not  overlap  with  that  of  the  ETUC.  For  example  when they were
discussing the Single Market and its effects on European labor during 1980s, we
were trying to figure out who we were, what we should do.’ 
47 Although TÜRK-İŞ could not reach any common ground with the ETUC until the late
1980s, the organization’s relations with the ILO were intact. In 1995, Turkey ratified the
ILO  Termination  of  Employment  Convention  (C158),  which  standardizes  the  firing
process.  The  ratification  of  this  agreement  permitted  ILO  surveillance  of  Turkish
employment practices. Upon TÜRK-İŞ’s two complaints to the ILO, in 1996 and in 2000,
the ILO warned the Turkish government that it must change its internal legal practices
(Çelik 2003). In 2000, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security started to work on the
law on work safety  and stated in  the National  Program (presented to  the EU)  that
passing that law was a short-term priority (Çelik 2003).
48 Despite the government’s attempts to improve its policy, TÜRK-İŞ was not satisfied. The
confederation started to take an openly anti-EU position after 2000, for a variety of
reasons  related  to  the  organization’s  own  structure.  Only  recently,  since  the  EU’s
December  2004  decision  to  start  membership  negotiations  with  the  Turkish
government in October 2005, has TÜRK-İŞ  softened its criticisms against the EU and
Turkey’s  EU  membership.  Several  explanations  for  the  anti-EU  stance  of  the
confederation may be advanced. 
49 First, as an organization whose strength is determined by the number of its members
and financed by membership fees, TÜRK-İŞ  has to take a stance compatible with its
constituents. Because TÜRK-İŞ is mainly organized in State Owned Enterprises and the
public  sector,  TÜRK-İŞ’s  interest  in  keeping  the  state-centric  organization  of  the
Turkish economy and securing the subsidies and the protection of the government is at
odds  with  the  economic  requirements  of  the  EU.  The  EU  requires  that  candidate
countries have a liberal free-market style economy. It is not surprising that TÜRK-İŞ
toughened its  anti-EU position beginning the year 2000,  in response to the Turkish
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government’s privatization efforts. In 2000, the Turkish government privatized State
Owned Enterprises worth $2,716,500,000.00, while SOEs worth almost half this amount
were  privatized  in  1998  ($1,019,700,000.00)  and  a  similar  amount  in  2004
($1,265,700,000.00). 
50 The second reason for  TÜRK-İŞ’s  anti-EU stance  is  related  to  the  EU’s  structure  of
‘social partnership.’ TÜRK-İŞ sees the ETUC not as a trade union confederation that is
watchful of workers’ interests but rather as a neo-corporatist institution designed to
help the EU execute its policies. Yıldırım Koç (2003a: 52), who represented TÜRK-İŞ in
ETUC Congresses, argues that European labor’s interests are in line with the interests of
European employers and governments and that European workers are a part of the
imperialist system that the EU represents. Koç (2003a: 52) posits that the Commission’s
financing  of  some  of  the  ETUC’s  projects  is  a  clear  example  of  the  corporatist
relationship between the EU and the Confederation. Yıldırım Koç actually calls the EU
‘the United States of Europe’ and ‘the European Union State,’ which helps him to frame
his argument in the context of corporatism as well as implying the ‘imperialist’ policies
of the EU by the wording ‘the United States of Europe.’ The imperialism rhetoric is still
prevalent in Turkish workers’ discourse. Both TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK representatives voice
their concerns over the ‘imperial capitalist’ nature of the EU and how it is an elite-
driven institution serving the interests of the employers (Koç 2003b; Yıldız 2004).
51 The third reason for TÜRK-İŞ’s  anti-EU stance is  due to its  nationalist  attitude that
became especially prevalent after the 1992 change in its management cadres. In every
forum, TÜRK-İŞ officials criticize the EU’s stance on the Kurdish, Armenian and Cyprus
issues. TÜRK-İŞ argues that these issues are matters of national sovereignty and that
the  EU  has  ulterior  motives  in  demanding  a  transformation  of  Turkish  policies.
According to Yıldırım Koç (2003b), 
‘The  European  Union’s  demands  for  Turkey  [to  change  its  above  mentioned
policies] are in opposition to the Turkish Republic’s unitary state system and its
independence. Abiding by these demands would tear our country apart and divide
it, creating a new Yugoslavia. Turkey is not going to solve its problems through the
EU. Turkey is not going to be stronger because of the EU. Turkey is going to solve its
problems despite the EU, and it will be stronger. Turkey’s admittance to the EU is
dependent on this strength.’ 
52 TÜRK-İŞ’s doubts about the EU’s structure and how the EU membership would affect
Turkish national interests created friction between the trade union confederations. In
2003,  TÜRK-İŞ  criticized the other trade union federations (DİSK, HAK-İŞ  and KESK)
because of the project-based financial aid they had taken from the ETUC. Given that
TÜRK-İŞ  has kept a very close relationship with Turkish governments, especially up
until the 1990s, their criticism on the total independence of trade unions is not very
convincing. TÜRK-İŞ has been the target of vehement criticisms from the trade union
community. One representative from DİSK, for example, argues that TÜRK-İŞ criticized
the project-based funding from the EU for other trade union confederations because
there was competition between the trade union confederations to receive the funding
and  TÜRK-İŞ  could  not  compete with  the  other  confederations,  and  thus  TÜRK-İŞ
subsequently acquired a hostile attitude towards the EU and whoever works with the
EU (Interview with the DİSK representative, İstanbul, 2004). The HAK-İŞ representative,
on the other hand, charges that TÜRK-İŞ does not know the institutional characteristics
of the EU or what it means to be a member of the EU, and that is the reason for its
opposition. As explained above, TÜRK-İŞ’s international relations are interlocked with
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the developments that affect it  in the Turkish domestic scene. Its opposition to the
privatization policies are reflected in its position towards the EU. The changes in its
ideological stance against the EU, in parallel to the political developments in Turkey,
reinforce  the  hypothesis  that  the  appeal  to  the  international  ally  depends  on  the
degree of salience. 
 
TÜRK-İŞ’s Appeals to the EU
53 After  the  1999  Helsinki  Summit,  TÜRK-İŞ  started  making  appeals  to  the  EU  in  its
activities  such  as  agenda-setting,  lobbying  to  push  for  domestic  policy  change  and
changing institutional procedures in Turkey. Until that time, TÜRK-İŞ concentrated its
activities on the national level,  only occasionally alluding to the international labor
standards of the ILO or the ICTFU. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the confederation’s
relations  with  international  organizations  were  limited  to  ‘moral  support,  sharing
technical information and consultation’ (Tokol 1994: 73). Between 1980 and 1994, Tokol
(1994: 129) suggests that despite some disruptions, TÜRK-İŞ continued its relationships
with the ICTFU and the ETUC. In the 1990s, when all trade union confederations were
redefining  themselves  and  their  policy  positions,  TÜRK-İŞ  chose  to  oppose  EU
membership, although its stance changed after 2004. Asked about why they would/not
interact with the EU, TÜRK-İŞ representative argue that the domestic and international
prestige, information that they get from their European counterparts are important.
What  the  respondents  name  as  domestic  and  international  prestige  is  actually
representative  of  their  concerns  about  their  own  organizations’  legitimacy  and  is
illustrative of how they use the EU in their discourse. Below, the paper presents how
the organization establishes its stance against the EU. 
 
Setting the Agenda 
54 TÜRK-İŞ organized major strikes and boycotts between 1989 and 1995, demonstrating
strong opposition to the employer groups and the government (Şenalp, Reyhan & Köse
2003:  16).  These  strikes  and  boycotts  mainly  protested  the  privatization  practices.
Between 1995 and 2000, the strikes continued, reaching a peak in 1997 and 1998. All
these strikes attracted public attention and kept the workers’ problems on the agenda.
Only in its  1995 General  Assembly report did TÜRK-İŞ  allude to the EU. The report
announced that ‘the undemocratic 1982 Constitution and its legal framework shall be
transformed in a way that it is aligned with the universal democratic principles of the
international accords to which Turkey is a signatory. It should also be brought to the
standards that the EU sets since we applied for membership’ (TÜRK-İŞ history). 
55 Yet in December 2001, TÜRK-İŞ declared its opposition to the EU by presenting an anti-
EU  report  to  the  President.  The report  was  titled,  ‘What  does  the  EU  want  from
Turkey?’ and it focused on the political criteria that EU membership necessitates. The
report  criticized the  EU policy  positions  on Cyprus,  Armenian issues,  and minority
rights, arguing that the EU is trying to carve up the Turkish republic. The report was
thus a declaration of TÜRK-İŞ  leadership’s political views rather than a statement of
social rights pertinent to Turkish workers’ needs. 
56 In June 2002, TÜRK-İŞ placed a full-page anti-EU advertisement in a Turkish daily. Çelik
(2004: 79) quotes the advertisement, 
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‘They  [those  who  support  the  EU  membership  and  the  changes  of  the
harmonization  process]  are  being  disrespectful  to  the  Turkish  nation’s  history,
abilities  and  goals  by  arguing  that  Turkey  would  turn  into  a  Middle  Eastern
authoritarian state  if  Turkey does  not  do  everything the  EU requires.  This  is  a
submissive act.’
57 Another way that TÜRK-İŞ sets the agenda is via its surveys. One survey that attracted
media attention was ‘TÜRK-İŞ’s View of the EU during the Acccession Process.’ TÜRK-İŞ
asked three thousand employees about their views on the EU before the EU decision to
start the accession negotiations in October 2005. This survey revealed that 65 percent
of the workers surveyed believed that joining the EU would be beneficial for them in
their  work-life,  while  the  remaining  35  percent  disagreed.  Then  85  percent  of  the
workers answered ‘no’ to the question, ‘Should Turkey become a member of the EU no
matter  what?’  Even  the  wording  of  this  question  implies  TÜRK-İŞ’s  disinclination
towards the EU membership. More questions implying the EU’s negativity are included
in the survey, such as ‘Do you think the EU is putting Turkey off?’ or ‘Do you believe
that the EU is going to give a date for the start of negotiations in December 2004?’ All
these questions are worded in a way to raise the suspicion of the interviewee about the
EU. 
58 After  the  EU’s  17  December  2004  decision  to start  the  membership  negotiations  in
October 2005, some of this reticence seems to have softened. On December 19th, TÜRK-
İŞ reported that it would launch a program to improve the workers’ rights to surpass
the  EU  standards.  The  education  secretary  of  the  Confederation,  Mustafa  Türker,
argued that the president of the EU Parliament, Josep Borell Fontelles, urges the trade
union confederations to have more say during the European Summits and supports
TÜRK-İŞ’s attempts to improve workers rights in Turkey (Birgün, 12/19/2004). This is an
important example of the rapid change of attitude in TÜRK-İŞ, as Türker’s mention of
Borell can be interpreted as a way of legitimizing TÜRK-İŞ’s attempt to change Turkish
practices.  Since  2004,  TÜRK-İŞ  has  not  been  engaged  in  an  agenda-setting  activity
similar to the organizations’ vehement reactions to the EU during the late 1990s. Today,
TÜRK-İŞ  publishes reports on the Turkey’s adoption of the EU acquis on its website,
criticizes  the Turkish national  program’s  insufficient  measures on social  policy and
follows the Turkish- EU negotiation process closely (TÜRK-İŞ 2009 a)
 
Lobbying for Policy Change 
59 TÜRK-İŞ’s  use of  the EU in policy-related arguments is  relatively new. As explained
above, TÜRK-İŞ is primarily interested in two issues: labor laws that limit the workers’
rights and the privatization policies of the state. The European Community Charter on
Fundamental Social  Rights for Workers (1989) and the revised European Social  Pact
(1989) include far greater freedoms for workers than the Turkish laws. According to
one  trade-unionist,  TÜRK-İŞ  activities  may  have  been  counter-productive,  actually
hurting the process of improving social policies. ‘With its reluctant attitude towards
the EU, one can argue that TÜRK-İŞ contributed to the insufficiency of the reforms on
social policy. TÜRK-İŞ made the reform process harder’ (Çelik 2004: 79). TÜRK-İŞ’s anti-
European stance undermined the negotiations within the Economic and Social Council
and its criticisms of the other trade union confederations that were cooperating with
the EU created uneasiness in the Turkish-EU trade union relations.
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60 TÜRK-İŞ’s criticisms went as far as hurting the European Trade Union Confederations’
credibility in regional discussions. In 2000, Yıldırım Koç, the TÜRK-İŞ representative to
the ETUC, noted in an ETUC meeting about the Balkan Stability Pact that the ETUC’s
efforts at creating such a pact would not be beneficial to the European workers and
would jeopardize the sovereignty of these countries (Koç 2003a). Having discredited the
institution’s  policies,  Koç  was  suspended  from  the  working  group  of  the  Balkan
Stability Pact. 
61 TÜRK-İŞ’s extreme opposition has softened, especially with the rising voices of strong
trade  unions  within  the  Confederation  defending  EU  membership.  Kristal-  İŞ  and
Petrol-  İŞ,  for  example,  point  out  the  benefits  of  EU  membership  to  the  Turkish
workers’  movement.  Aziz  Çelik  from Kristal-  İŞ  suggests  that  adoption of  European
social  norms and practices represent a positive step for Turkish workers and trade
union  confederations,  and  that  TÜRK-İŞ  needs  to  actively  support  Turkey’s
membership and work with its European counterpart (the ETUC) (Radikal, 6/18/2002).
Petrol- İŞ, on the other hand, has decided to ‘turn the EU harmonization process into an
advantage for the trade union,’ and ‘it is looking forward to the changes in the trade
union laws’ (Petrol- İŞ 2004). 
62 In  accord  with  these  ideas,  during  the  opening  of  the  Turkish  Economy  Congress,
TÜRK-İŞ President Salih Kılıç (2004a) concluded his speech by saying, ‘We should take
our place in the modern world by targeting the European Union’s social model, and
integrating into the Union.’ TÜRK-İŞ seems to have transformed its discourse back into
that of its old days, suggesting that ‘modernization’ is a primary goal of the Turkish
Republic and that the path to modernization proceeds through Westernization, which
is represented by the EU. In fact, during the Board of Presidents meeting in 2004, Salih
Kılıç (2004b) argued that, ‘Membership in the EU is a primary national goal for Turkey.
It  is  the  biggest  step  in  the  modernization  project  that  the  great  leader  Atatürk
designed.’ 
63 The end of the extreme opposition to EU membership within TÜRK-İŞ is also due to the
change of  the management cadres.  President  Bayram Meral  resigned from his  post
when he  was  elected as  a  parliamentarian for  the  Republican People’s  Party  (CHP)
during the 2002 elections. Today, TÜRK-İŞ president appeals to the European standards
of syndical rights as well as collective bargaining, strike and lockout agreements while
preparing the draft laws (TÜRK-İŞ 2009 b).
 
Changing the Institutional Procedures within Turkey 
64 The incorporation of workers’ organizations in the decision-making procedures of the
Turkish  government  after  1980  occurred  gradually.  Under  the  Turkish  Ministry  of
Labor, a Labor Assembly was created in 1946 in order to bring together the interested
parties to discuss issues related to all  areas of working life and labor. Although the
Assembly has only a consultative role, it constitutes an area of discussion between the
employer  associations,  trade confederations,  the  Scientific  Board (which consists  of
academics  appointed  by  the  national  education  board),  and  related  government
agencies. The Labor Assembly convened five times between 1946 and 1971 and three
times between 1971 and 1992. The next meeting of the Labor Assembly did not take
place  until  2004,  when  the  Minister  of  Labor  and  Social  Security  stated  that  the
Ministry  sees  the  Labor  Assembly  as  an  important  platform  to  improve  the  social
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dialogue (MLSSb: 4). During the 2004 meeting, TÜRK-İŞ President Salih Kılıç alluded to
the social dialogue practices in European countries, arguing that Turkey should follow
that example (MLSSb: 62). 
65 TÜRK-İŞ participates actively in the decision-making processes in which it is included
by law, or by the discretion of the government. The confederation is represented in the
Economic  and  Social  Council  and  in  the  EU-Turkey  Joint  Consultative  Committee.
TÜRK-İŞ also organizes working groups on legal issues that are of interest to employees
and presents its resolutions to lawmakers through these two institutions. In April 2004,
for  example,  a  working  group  composed  of  TÜRK-İŞ  representatives,  lawyers  and
professors came together to discuss the draft legislation on trade union law (TÜRK-İŞ
2004: 25), indicative of its move to strengthen its research branch. 
66 In short, TÜRK-İŞ appeals to the EU, especially in its agenda-setting activities. Because
the confederation’s constituency is directly affected by the privatization policies that
are required by the global economy and the EU, however, this appeal is in the form of
criticism. TÜRK-İŞ’s views on EU membership have changed significantly in the 2000s,
from  the  negative  implications  of  EU  membership  to  the  positive  social  policy
outcomes. The confederation used to portray the EU as an outside power pressuring
Turkey to give up its  sovereignty (on Cyprus,  Armenian and Kurdish issues) and to
carry  out  privatization  projects.  Especially  under  the  leadership  of  Bayram Meral,
TÜRK-İŞ used the EU in its discourse to criticize the government and its policies. Even
on issues that are of  immediate interest  to workers,  such as the right to collective
bargaining  and  strikes,  TÜRK-İŞ  did  not  pursue  a  strategy  of  lobbying  the  Turkish
government by using the European Union as a tool. Yet, after the EU declared that the
negotiations for full membership would start in October 2005, TÜRK-İŞ started to soften
its  position  towards  the  EU  and  has  increasingly  delineated  the  benefits  of  EU
membership for the Turkish trade unions movement. 
 
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK) and Its Relations with the
State
67 The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK) is the only confederation in
this research that has a leftist ideology. DİSK has been subjected to severe repression in
the  1980s,  dismantled  and  its  leaders  put  in  jail.  In  1991,  when  the  confederation
regained its legal status, and re-opened, its reappearance has been important in the
Turkish labor movement, giving it a new dimension in parallel to the EU social agenda.
With  the  changing  environment  of  the  1990s,  DİSK  reformulated  itself  as  a
confederation in line with the European trade unions.3 DİSK, with the liberalization of
the domestic environment started to appeal more to the EU, especially in its lobbying
activities, and the organization’s reformulation of itself changed its perceptions of the
EU. 
68 DİSK brings together 22 trade unions and has 312,990 members. DİSK spun off from
TÜRK-İŞ in 1967. Earlier, in 1961, a group of 12 trade unionists from TÜRK-İŞ founded
the Turkish Worker’s Party (TİP) which was the first Marxist party to win seats in the
parliament  (Sayarı  2002:  187).  Trade  unionists  who  sympathized  with this  party
founded  their  own  confederation  in  1967.  DİSK  declares  on  its  website  that  its
understanding of trade-unionism is based on class relations: ‘(T)rade Unions are the
part of the contradiction and struggle between labor and capital. Workers exploited
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and crushed by capital come together within trade unions to defend their interests’
(DİSK  2004a).  Until  the  1980  military  coup,  DİSK’s  class-based  ideology  placed  the
confederation in opposition to TÜRK-İŞ. DİSK quickly became the rival to TÜRK-İŞ, and
pursued an agenda against the state’s policies. The 1980 military coup, however, hurt
DİSK the most since the confederation was banned for over a decade. DİSK also suffers
from a lack of financial resources. Gaye Yılmaz (2004), a DİSK official, argues that only
four  of  the  twenty  two  members  of  the  confederation  pay  their  dues  to  the
confederation regularly since the member trade unions are also experiencing financial
difficulties.
69 One of DİSK’s founding principles was to fight for worker’s  rights using any means
possible.  In  contrast  to  TÜRK-İŞ’s  attempts  at  staying  ‘beyond  party  politics,’  DİSK
declared that ‘(P)rofessional struggle is not sufficient for attaining the full  rights of
workers. It must be complemented by political struggle, utilizing all of the democratic
rights enumerated in the Constitution’ (Frederick Ebert Stiftung 2004).  The political
aspect of DİSK’s activities put the state and the confederation on opposite sides. DİSK
cooperated with student unions, and argued for an ‘independent’ and ‘anti-capitalist’
system in Turkey. The 1970s were the most problematic years in Turkish economic and
political  history.  A  series  of  coalition governments  that  were composed of  political
parties fundamentally opposed to one another were ruling the country and there was
no consistent economic policy. With the oil crisis of 1973 and the American embargo
following the Cyprus intervention, the economy deteriorated further (Müftüler- Baç
1997: 78), resulting in low wages and high inflation. 
70 By 1975, when the center-right Justice Party (JP) became the leader of the so-called
National Front coalition, the gap between the right and left grew (Sayarı 2002: 14). With
the JP-led government moving further to the right, both the political left and right
radicalized and political violence escalated, coming to an end with the 1980 coup. The
military regime closed down and confiscated the assets of DİSK and its affiliated unions.
The military regime put DİSK officials on trial, demanding the death penalty for their
‘attempts to demolish the constitutional regime’ (Frederick-Ebert-Stiftung 2004). After
years of trials, the Military Court of Appeals acquitted the union leaders in 1991 and
DİSK was able to resume its activities. 
71 In June 1992, the leaders of all DİSK affiliates assembled to discuss the future of the
Confederation. They concluded that “unionization in general had severely declined, the
former union cadres had almost disappeared, and most of their former members were
retired or otherwise withdrawn from the labor market. This situation, coupled with the
aggression of the employers and the changes in production and technology required
the formulation of new trade union policies.” Confronting this charged environment,
DİSK started to form affiliations with other trade unions, and spearheaded the creation
of the Democracy Platform. In addition, DİSK advanced its relations with international
organizations such as the ICFTU and the ETUC.
 
International Linkages, Relations with the EU 
72 In its early years, in line with its Marxist disposition, DİSK established relationships
with Soviet-satellite third world countries. It had also applied for membership in the
ETUC in 1973, but had been rejected (Frederick-Ebert-Stiftung 2004). During the 1970s,
some  of  DİSK’s  affiliate  trade  unions  made  connections  with  international  trade
secretariats (Tokol 1994: 73). These international trade secretariats were affiliated with
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the ICFTU and other international  confederations.  Some Turkish trade unions were
thus indirectly linked to the international trade union movement. 
73 The Turkish government’s ban on DİSK following the 1980 coup raised international
awareness for the Turkish union movement, and the ICFTU, the ETUC, the ILO and the
EU kept DİSK on their agendas (Tokol 1994: 103, 110). In 1982, the European Parliament
criticized the military courts that put the trade union members on trial and requested
that the Council and the Commission freeze EU-Turkish relations. In 1985, the ETUC
granted  membership  to  DİSK.  As  a  result  of  international  pressure  combined  with
progressive internal developments, DİSK was reinstated in 1991. After 1992, DİSK joined
the ICFTU as well. 
74 Since  its  inclusion  in  the  ETUC,  DİSK  prioritized  its  relations  with  its  European
counterpart, being the only Turkish trade union confederation that has a permanent
representative in Brussels. 4 DİSK views the Turkish trade union movements’ interests
lying  with  the  EU  and  establishes  relationships  with  the  ETUC  in  order  to  pursue
Turkey’s membership in the union. DİSK representatives underline the importance of
Turkish membership in the EU and the benefits it will bring to the Turkish working
class. 
75 Süleyman Çelebi, president of the confederation declared in 2001, 
‘The European Union does not consist solely of an economic partnership, it has a
social aspect. This social aspect has been developed over the years by trade unions
of member countries. Trade unions have gained social rights in their own countries
after years of struggle and the EU today presents a combination of all these social
rights. In addition, European trade union movement constantly pressures the EU
and the member countries to improve these rights.  Turkey is  required to make
changes to its social policies and improve the Turkish workers’ social rights as well.
The  Partnership  for  Association  document,  for  example,  requires  the  Turkish
government to  review the provisions  of  the Constitution on the rights  of  trade
unions and employer associations in near future’ (Doğan 2003: 33-34). 
76 Çelebi’s comments clarify that DİSK is aware of the changes that EU membership will
bring and that it supports the EU consciously. DİSK states this about its international
relations: ‘DİSK has given prime importance to the international struggle of working
class  since  its  establishment.  It  has  become  a  member  of  the  International
Confederation  of  Free  Trade  Unions  (ICFTU)  and  the  European  Trade  Unions'
Confederation (ETUC) in order to attain class solidarity and to carry the struggle for the
rights and freedoms of workers to the international level’ (DİSK 2004a).
77 Asked about the reasons of its support of relations with the EU, respondents argue that
first,  the  EU’s  provisions  are  better  for  workers,  second,  the  EU supports  workers’
training and increases DİSK’s informational capacity. International prestige is the last
reason that respondents provided for DİSK’s interaction with the EU. Having stated the
reasons, what are the ways that DİSK appeals to the EU? 
 
DİSK’s Appeals to the EU 
78 DİSK, cognizant of the improvements that EU membership could bring to Turkish social
policies, appeals to the EU by both agenda setting activities and lobbying. It lobbies the
Turkish  government  to  change  its  policies  according  to  EU  standards,  and  to  gain
support for Turkish membership. DİSK’s Brussels representation takes an active role in
ETUC activities related to Turkey. 
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79 After  its  reinstatement  in  1991,  DİSK skillfully  transformed its  organization.  Under
economic globalization DİSK maintained that  a  successful  trade union movement is
only possible through international collaboration. Süleyman Çelebi asserts, 
‘In face of the problems that arise with globalization, international collaboration
becomes  more  important.  Laborers  of  our  country  should  be  members  of  this
process, instead of being subjected to the effects of globalization passively. Crises in
one country or  region spread rapidly  to  others.  Therefore,  we should be active
participants in international struggles and cooperation.
Within the EU, there is a strong effort to improve the existing rights of workers.
Our country’s laborers should understand that these efforts, to which they have not
paid  attention  so  far,  are  going  to  influence  their  lives.  We cannot  pursue  our
struggles solely on the national front any more. We have to support the laborers of
the EU countries in their struggles’ (Doğan 2003: 33). 
80 DİSK argues that reaching European standards of social policy is more important than
being a member of the EU. 
81 Alluding often to the necessity of Turkish membership to the EU, DİSK designed and
participated  in  specific  European  Commission  projects  such  as  the  MEDA-TURKEY
Project for Civil  Society: Trade Unions and Democracy and the Europe Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights. These projects call for the training of Turkish workers
and trade unionists in EU-related issues. For instance, under the Europe Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights project, named ‘Human Rights for All.’ Three hundred
DİSK members from six regions of Turkey are trained to give human rights lessons to
ten workers within their  region.  Via this  project,  DİSK raises awareness for human
rights. DİSK’s effort at training workers and involving labor in human rights debates is
an  attempt  to  improve  Turkey’s  human rights  record,  the  target  of  continued  EU
criticism. 
 
Lobbying for Policy Change 
82 DİSK appeals to European social policies when it is lobbying the Turkish government to
change  its  policies.  For  instance,  the  Democracy  Platform (then Labor  Platform)  of
which DİSK is a founding member declared in its program that the government should
ratify the articles of the European Social Charter, including workers’ right to organize
(Article 5), bargain collectively (Article 6), children’s rights (Article 7), and women and
children’s right to economic and social protection (Article 17). 
83 The 2003 labor law has stirred up vehement debates between employers, employees,
and the government as  well.  Briefly,  Turkish job security  laws and the legal  rights
workers  have  vis-à-vis  the  employers  during  expulsion  from  work  are  not  well
developed and even the latest changes introduced during the harmonization process
cannot  meet  the  European  standards.  Employers’  unions,  exercising  their  leverage
against the government, shaped the work law in their own interests to the detriment of
workers. DİSK points out the insufficiency of the current law and argues for bettering it
by raising it to European standards. The general secretary of DİSK Musa Çam (2004)
argues, 
‘The  work  law  that  entered  into  force  in  June  2003  does  not  meet  the  EU
harmonization criteria. The 2004 National Program [the changes that the Turkish
government  declares  it  is  going  to  carry  out  to  comply  with  the  EU  criteria]
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promised a solution to this problem and the Minister of Labor and Social Security
has admitted that the changes introduced fall  short of meeting even the lowest
European standards…The National Program’s section on Social Policies and Labor,
however, do not reflect the EU acquis. Especially the topics of collective expulsion,
transfer of work place, responsibility of the employer to inform the employees of
conditions related to contracts… are not included in the National Program.’ 
84 By  comparing  the  Turkish  laws  and  EU  directives  on  social  policies,  Çam  (2004)
promotes the improvement of Turkish workers’ rights. DİSK also publishes research on
different European countries’  social  policy practices to support its  arguments (DİSK
2004b).  During the discussions of the draft law on trade unions that is  high on the
agenda in Turkey in 2009. DİSK follows a similar strategy. By showing the discrepancies
between  the  Turkish  and  European  practices, DİSK  tries  to  push  the  Turkish
government to change its policies. 
 
Changing Institutional Procedures
85 DİSK has been a strong force in changing Turkish institutional practices and taking part
in  the  decision-making  procedures  of  the  state  via  its  linkages  with  the  EU.  DİSK
participated in the foundation of the Economic and Social Council as well as the EU-
Turkey Joint Consultative Committee; and its Brussels representation has established
relationships with the ETUC (Doğan 2003: 32). 
86 DİSK, as the only Turkish trade union confederation with permanent representation in
Brussels, participates in the EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee, by giving expert
advice to the European side about Turkish civil society (Doğan 2003: 32). DİSK’s Brussels
representative Yücel Top also acted as the coordinator to launch a Turkish Trade Union
Coordination Commission. Within the MEDA-TURKEY Project for Civil Society: Trade
Unions  and  Democracy,  Yücel  Top  coordinated  a  Commission  composed  of  three
Turkish  trade  union  confederations  (DİSK,  KESK  and  HAK-İŞ).  This  Commission
provided a resource center to Turkish trade unions in all areas touching on relations
between Turkey and the European Union by accumulating reference material as well as
carrying out studies and groundwork for joint activities. The Commission started its
operations in late 2001 and completed its projects in 2004.
87 DİSK  enjoys  exceptionally  good  relations  with  the  European  trade  unions
confederation,  the  ETUC.  In  1985,  when  the  European  confederation  granted  DİSK
membership,  it  also  appointed  Kemal  Baştürk,  then  the  president  of  DİSK,  to  its
executive  board.  While  this  was  more  of  a  symbolic  gesture  (targeted  towards  the
Turkish government, signaling that the EU does not approve of the military coup and
its rule), it opened the way for DİSK executives to deepen the relations later on. Indeed,
after  its  reinstatement  DİSK  was  actively  involved  in  the  ETUC.  In  1992,  DİSK  co-
organized  and  hosted  the  ETUC’s  Balkan  Trade  Unions  Confederation  meeting  in
Ankara. DİSK participates in the ETUC’s executive committee meetings as well. In sum,
DİSK is an important actor in Turkey’s relations with the EU and actively participates in
the decision and policy-making procedures of the government. 
88 Started in the late 1960s with a revolutionary ideology, by the 1990s DİSK transformed
itself  into  a  progressive  trade  union  confederation  which  is  supportive  of  Turkish
membership  to  the EU.  DİSK  has  established  strong  relations  with  the  ETUC  and
participates in various institutions founded during Turkey’s harmonization process to
the EU. The confederation uses its linkages with the ETUC and its place in transnational
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institutions  to  pressure  the  state  to  change  its  policies.  DİSK’s  case clearly
demonstrates that to what extent the organization is limited is of great importance to
the  latter’s  appeal  to  the  EU.  When  DİSK  was  closed  down,  having  no  political
opportunity,  it  could  not  have  appealed  to  the  EU.  As  mentioned  above,  now  the
Brussels representative had interactions with his European friends, but the ‘appeal to
the EU in order to change state policies’  as this research postulates could not have
happened since this research focuses on a domestic organization’s appeal to the EU, not
on the informal linkages founded. The case also proves that DİSK’s reformulation of
itself in the 1990s and its alignment with European trade unions is a very important
factor in this appeal to the EU. Prioritizing the same issues, EU became a critical ally for
DİSK.
 
Confederation of Justice Seekers’ Trade Unions (HAK-İŞ) and Its Relations with
the State 
89 Confederation of Justice Seekers’ Trade Unions (HAK-İŞ)’s stance towards the EU has
changed through the years,  and the liberalization of the domestic environment has
helped the confederation to establish interactions with the EU. HAK-İŞ’s appeal to the
EU has been intricately linked with the organization’s liaisons with the government.
When the government was pursuing the EU, its appeal to the EU has been strong, and
vice versa. 
90 HAK-İŞ is the third confederation of trade unions in size, bringing together nine trade
unions totaling 235,676 members. HAK-İŞ’s main source of income is membership fees
as well. HAK-İŞ  representatives did not complain of financial difficulties, contrary to
DİSK (Interviews, Ankara, 2004). HAK-İŞ, founded upon Islamist ideologies during the
radical polarization of the 1970s, was not an active player in the Turkish trade union
movement  until  the  late  1980s.  The  confederation  actually  defines  its  history  by
breaking it down into three phases, 1976-1980, 1980-1984 and the period since 1984.
The first two phases are referred to as ‘the founding years’ and ‘the prohibited and lost
years’ respectively (HAK-İŞ 2004a). HAK-İŞ was closed down by the 1980 military coup.
Although it was reinstated the following year, the confederation did not become active
again until the 1990s. 
91 In HAK-İŞ’s ideology, the employer-employee interests are not conflictual. Rather, the
confederation posits that ‘HAK-İŞ  is going to weigh the rights of the employers and
employees in a balance of justice and it will grant the rights to those who deserve them’
(Tokol 1994: 61). HAK-İŞ, like TÜRK-İŞ, supports cooperation among the major actors. 
92 HAK-İŞ  is  known to have had close relations with the Welfare Party (WP, known in
Turkish as the Refah Partisi or RP) which was closed down in 1998. Necati Çelik, an ex-
president and an important figure of the confederation, was elected as an MP from the
Welfare Party in the 1995 elections and became the Labor Minister in the coalition
government  (Doğan  2003:  34).  HAK-İŞ  maintained  its  relations  with  the  newcomer
Islamist parties, and established especially good relations with the AKP, which skillfully
transformed the Islamic discourse into a pro-European Union stance. The president of
HAK-İŞ declared in the November 1999 general assembly that:
‘…HAK-İŞ…wants  Turkey  to  pursue  a  peaceful  foreign  policy  based  on  mutual
interests and abide by the rules and norms of international agreements such as the
European Social Charter… HAK-İŞ expects and demands a state that organizes its
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Constitution according to international norms, and one which respects democratic
principles, human rights, and freedom of thought’ (Doğan 2003: 35). 
93 Two members of HAK-İŞ joined the parliament in the 2002 elections as part of the AKP.
Given the organic relations between the ruling party and the confederation, HAK-İŞ
does not have difficulties in voicing its concerns to the government. HAK-İŞ’s strong
support for EU membership seems to have facilitated friendly relations as well.  The
president  of  the  confederation  joined  the  current  Prime  Minister  Recep  Tayyip
Erdoğan,  who  at  the  time  had  not  been  able  to  assume  the  post  because  of  legal
impediments, during his visit to Copenhagen in 2002. On the other hand, during the
interviews,  a  lower level  official  complained that  the current  government does not
include the trade union in its European-level activities. The interviewee (Ankara, 2004)
argues: 
‘Former governments (Mesut Yılmaz, the Prime Minister between 1997- 1999, and
Şükrü Sina Gürel, Minister of State from 1997 to 2002), used to ask us to go and
lobby  the  EU,  whereas  this  government  does  not  include  us  in  its  lobbying
activities. They founded the European Union Communication Group and included
the employer organizations; they did not take us in.’
94 HAK-İŞ  is  included  in  many  initiatives  that  were  started  by  the  government,  and
according to many, it actually enjoys some privileges because of its closeness to the
government.  For  example,  HAK-İŞ  is  a  member of  the  Reform Monitoring Group,  a
government initiative to examine the implementation of the political reforms, and of
the Ministry of Industrial Relations’ Board on Advertisements. HAK-İŞ is thus included
in  the  government  initiatives  that  encourage  civil  society  participation.  The
interviewee  from  TÜRK-İŞ,  as  well  as  the  employer  groups  and  other  CSO
representatives, all agree that HAK-İŞ’s Islamic background and its close relations with
AKP provides it with leverage with the government over other trade unions. 
 
International Linkages, Relations with EU 
95 HAK-İŞ’s stance towards the EU has changed over time. Similar to the Turkish Islamist
movement,  which  has  became  a  staunch  supporter  of  “Westernization”  and  the
European Union, HAK-İŞ transformed itself from being anti-European in the 1980s and
early  1990s  into being pro-European.  In  December 1989,  HAK-İŞ  declared its  stance
towards the EU: 
‘A  major  challenge  to  integration  with  Europe  is  Turkey’s  Muslim  population.
Turkey,  because  of  its  historical,  moral,  philosophical,  religious  and  national
characteristics, is not Western. ‘Westernization’ comes as a betrayal and alienation
to Turkish culture… if membership in the EU is pushed; this would mean a total
surrender  [to  Western  values].  On  the  other  hand,  Turkey’s  application  for  EU
membership means a heavy legal burden for the Constitution and other laws, and
constitutes  a  threat  to  state’s  sovereignty  and  nation’s  unity…the  fact  that  the
government and the opposition parties are silent about this raises questions’ (Çelik
2004: 79). 
96 In 2003, however, HAK-İŞ declared that the legal changes and Constitutional reforms
that have been made for accession purposes are ‘a further step in the Westernization
and modernization process that Atatürk launched’ (Çelik 2004: 79). 
97 HAK-İŞ has developed a strong technical team specializing in the EU, and partly due to
its close relations with the government, it has managed to participate in the decision
and policy-making processes of the state. ‘HAK-İŞ is successful because they have done
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what  the  other  trade-union  confederations  could  not,’  says  one  interviewee  (2004,
İstanbul).  HAK-İŞ  masters  technical  information  about  the  EU  processes,  launches
transnational  relations  and  effectively  participates  in  the  government’s  activities
concerning the EU harmonization process.
98 The  confederation  is  actively  involved  in  the  activities  of  the  EU-Turkey  Joint
Consultative Committee, the most efficient institution of partnership between the EU
and Turkey (Interviews, Ankara, 2004). Salim Uslu, president of HAK-İŞ, is a member of
the ‘interaction group’ within this committee, and he jointly prepares reports with the
European  Social Committee  members  on  issues  of  mutual  interest  to  both  sides,
including migration and accession issues (HAK-İŞ 2003: 24-35).
99 HAK-İŞ  is also an active participant of the ETUC’s activities. HAK-İŞ  argues that ‘the
state, civil society and even individuals ought to contribute to the EU harmonization
process.  Integration  to  the  EU  ought  to  be  an  interactive,  moreover,  a  proactive
process.  Otherwise,  as  a  society,  we  stay  on  the  defensive  and  only  watch  what  is
happening’ (HAK-İŞ 2003: 23).
100 HAK-İŞ  is  an  interesting  case  to  examine  since  its  relations  with  the  international
organizations only go back to 1997. According to Tokol (1994: 129), HAK-İŞ applied for
membership in the ETUC in 1992, but it was not admitted until 1997, the same year it
was admitted to the ICFTU. Despite the short history, HAK-İŞ seems to have founded
good  relations  especially  with  the  European  Trade  Unions  Confederation.  HAK-İŞ
argues that when Turkey is one day in the EU, the organization’s past relations with
ETUC  would  help  the  organization.  Moreover,  HAK-İŞ  sees  the  relations  with  its
European counterparts as beneficial to raising its informational capacity. 
 
HAK-İŞ’s Appeals to the EU 
101 Given  its  short  history  of  relations  with  Europe  and  its  political  affinity  with  the
government, HAK-İŞ’s appeals to the EU have been supportive of state activities. Other
trade unionists argue that HAK-İŞ sees its own interests lying with membership in the
EU, not only because of the social policies that the EU promotes but also out of self-
interest. It seems likely that if the current government fails to secure EU membership,
HAK-İŞ’s influence in the Turkish trade union movement is likely to decrease. HAK-İŞ
thus has been a fervent supporter of EU membership. It establishes relationships with
its EU counterparts and actively participates in their activities. The salience hypothesis
thus proves true. The domestic liberalization hypothesis holds true as well, since up to
1997 the confederation was not active neither domestically nor internationally.
 
Agenda-setting 
102 HAK-İŞ does not exclusively focus on agenda-setting activities that are aimed at raising
the public’s or its own members’ awareness about the EU. It does, however, organize
seminars  and  conferences  and  send  its  officials  to  international  conferences  and
training  sessions.  HAK-İŞ  emphasizes  creating  a  technical  team  of  experts  on  EU-
related issues and invests in sending its members to Europe for informational purposes.
Osman Yıldız, now the confederations’ international affairs director, was sent to the
London School of Economics for a master’s degree (Yıldız 2004). Ünal Özdem, the press
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consultant for HAK-İŞ, went to Copenhagen and Strasbourg to participate in a training
session to ‘Increase Knowledge about Human Rights and Democracy’ (Özdem 2004). 
103 HAK-İŞ  was  also  one of  the recipients  of  ETUC funds for  improving civil  society in
Turkey,  the  MEDA project.  Using MEDA funds,  HAK-İŞ  focused on ‘information and
training for Confederation leadership and officials on Turkey’s integration into the EU
through  local/regional  seminars  and  setting  up  a  “regional  information
superhighway”’ (ETUC 2002). In 2003, regional officials of HAK-İŞ from Ankara, Bursa
(western Turkey) and Elazığ (eastern Turkey) have completed their training sessions on
the  EU  (HAK-İŞ  2003:  81).  As  a  member  of  the  Turkish  Trade  Union  Coordination
Commission,  HAK-İŞ  also  participated  in  the  commission’s  activities.  Salim  Uslu,
president of the confederation, participated in the July 2003 seminar on the “Broadness
and Differences of Turkish Trade Union Movement,” for example (HAK-İŞ 2003: 79). 
 
Lobbying for Policy Change 
104 HAK-İŞ is reported to be able to voice its concerns to the government more easily than
the  other  confederations  thanks  to  its  political  affinity.  Yet,  it  uses  the  EU  in  its
arguments to promote the European standards for social policy. For example, at the
Labor  Assembly  convened  in  2004,  HAK-İŞ  argued  that  ‘…the  European  Strategy  of
Employment ought to be followed. This strategy calls for increasing the employment
rate via occupational training, encouraging entrepreneurship which means more and
better jobs, and ensuring equal opportunity to workers’ (HAK-İŞ 2004b). HAK-İŞ refers
to European practices in most, if not all, types of discussions concerning work relations.
HAK-İŞ strongly supports the EU sponsored ‘social dialogue’. Salim Uslu (2004) calls for
cooperation  between  the  employers,  employees  and  the  government  and  calls  the
employers  and  employees  ‘social  partners’  in  shaping  the  state’s  socio-economic
policies.  Given  HAK-İŞ’s  corporatist  style,  and  its  emphasis  on  collective  problem-
solving, this view is consistent with the confederation’s approach. 
105 When the government announced the minimum wage for 2005, HAK-İŞ contended that
the new minimum wage is not enough for the social development that EU membership
necessitates (HAK-İŞ 2004e). HAK-İŞ’s comments about the new minimum wage may be
interpreted as appealing to the EU standards in order to change the policies of the
government. Yet, compared to other organizations, HAK-İŞ’s rather muted criticism of
the  government  on  an  issue  of  fundamental  importance  to  labor  makes  this
interpretation problematic. 
106 TÜRK-İŞ  and DİSK have loyal supporters and long histories of working with the EU,
while HAK-İŞ is a relative newcomer to the Turkish trade union movement as well as to
the international arena. Its flourishing relations with the EU come at a time when the
Turkish government is also prioritizing EU membership. Therefore, HAK-İŞ’s dedication
to the EU may stem from its positive relations with the ruling party, the AKP.
107 In addition to its strongly European stance, HAK-İŞ also enjoys relations with Middle
Eastern trade unions. After the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, for example,
the president of the confederation sent sympathy messages to Palestinian trade unions
as well as visiting the Palestinian Ambassador in Ankara (HAK-İŞ 2004c). Whether HAK-
İŞ has actually internalized European norms and procedures and is trying to position
itself in a interdependent world with transnational linkages both to Europe and the
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Middle East or rather has some hidden agenda as some secularists believe and is only
using European discourse for other purposes is yet to be seen. 
 
Changing the Institutional Procedures 
108 HAK-İŞ,  along with other trade union confederations,  takes part  in state sponsored
institutions such as the Economic and Social Council as well as civil society initiatives
like the Labor Platform (formerly the Democracy Platform). In cooperation with other
civil society organizations within the Economic and Social Council,  HAK-İŞ  prepared
reports  during  1997-1999  to  improve  the  council’s  composition  which  suffers  from
state’s dominancy (HAK-İŞ 2003: 65). 
In  its  deliberations  with  other  institutions  and  employers,  HAK-İŞ  takes  a
cooperative stance. For example, HAK-İŞ’s president declared during the Turkish
Confederation of Employers’ Associations’ (TİSK) general assembly that ‘During the
negotiation process with the EU, employer and employee associations cannot leave
everything  to  the  government.  Civil  society  organizations  ought  to  be  in  close
cooperation with the state and the government ought to be more open to dialogue’
(HAK-İŞ 2004d). During the same meeting, Salim Uslu also argued that since the EU
directives maintain that the relations between the employers, employees, and the
state ought to be in the form of a social partnership, the civil society organizations
ought to come together to discuss the laws related to work life, and take it to the
government  afterwards.  He  also  said  that  ‘we  have  to  show  our  abilities  of
mediation and cooperation as well’ (HAK-İŞ 2004d). This discourse is different from
other  trade  union  confederations’  approach  to  the  relation  between  the  three
actors.  TÜRK-İŞ  and  DİSK  have  adversarial  approaches  towards  the  employers
groups. 
109 HAK-İŞ  also  participates  in  the  Ministry  of  Labor  and  Social  Security’s  EU  Social
Dialogue  Committee,  created  for  a  better  harmonization  process  with  the  EU.  This
committee brings together the social partners to discuss issues related to working life.
While  HAK-İŞ  claims that  it  has hosted some of  the meetings (HAK-İŞ  2003:  75),  an
official from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s EU Coordination Desk stated
that  they  have  not  yet  established  direct  relationships  with  the  trade  union
confederations (Interview, Ankara, 2004). 
110 HAK-İŞ was founded on Islamic principles that criticized the West and thus Turkey’s
Westernization efforts. After the 1997 ‘post-modern coup,’ the new Islamic party, the
AKP, softened the old Islamists’ extreme opposition to the West. HAK-İŞ followed AKP’s
footsteps as well as establishing strong relationships with the party and transformed
itself from being anti-European in 1980s and early 1990s into being pro-European in the
2000s. HAK-İŞ  has developed a strong technical team specializing in EU issues which
granted HAK-İŞ access and strength in its relations with the EU. The confederation uses
the EU in its discourse to push for policy changes such as promoting social dialogue
between employers, employees and the state. On workers’ rights issues, HAK-İŞ  does
not seem to push as hard to alter the state’s policies. 
 
Synopsis of the Findings and Conclusion 
111 Comparing three different trade union organizations, the research elaborates on the
reasons  why  and  how  employees’  organizations  articulate  their  demands  and
preferences and convey it to the state through their EU discourse. The confederations
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are examined in light of the following research questions: domestic actors appeal to the
EU, if so, why is this appeal made, and which factors influence domestic actors’ appeal
most? The paper hypothesizes that the more likely the trade unions to appeal to the EU
when (1) when they see their issue salient to the EU (2) the domestic environment is
more liberal. Thus, contrary to the duality of the open/closed environment theses of
boomerang and spiral models,, the research introduces the time dimension with the
liberalization variable, and accounts for the changes in the trade unions’ perceptions of
the EU with the salience variable. Supporting both hypotheses, evidence shows that
three employees’ groups vary in their motives as well as in their strategies.
112 After a thorough examination of each organization’s activities from primary sources
from  the  organizations  as  well  as  EU  documents,  interviews  and  newspapers,  this
research finds that employee organizations all appeal to the EU although their ways of
appeal vary. TÜRK-İŞ  uses the EU mostly in its agenda-setting activities to shape an
anti-EU public opinion up until 2004. The organization then starts to utilize the EU’s
labor and social policy to push the Turkish state to improve its practices in these areas.
HAK-İŞ,  on  the  contrary,  does  not  really  use  agenda-setting  as  a  policy  tool.  The
organization emphasizes the EU in its lobbying activities and it argues that the EU’s
rules  and  procedures  necessitate  greater  inclusion  of  labor  in  the  state’s  decision-
making institutions. The last employee organization, DİSK, uses all three strategies. It
supports  European  social  policies  in  its  agenda-setting,  lobbying  and  institutional
activities. 
113 The strategy difference between the three trade union confederations is a reflection of
their own organizational traits. Neither TÜRK-İŞ nor HAK-İŞ seem to have internalized
the European norms and rules of labor and social policy as much as DİSK. TÜRK-İŞ and
HAK-İŞ appeal to the EU on issues that are of direct interest to their organizations, but
on more general issues that are of interest to all laborers in Turkey, their criticisms are
rather muted. DISK, on the other hand, has been a strong supporter of the EU since
1990 and it emphasizes the importance of adopting the European standards in every
aspect of work life.
114 As these findings and the preceding discussion of each organization’s evolution show,
employee organizations appeal to the EU to legitimize their stance on issues and seek
domestic legitimacy. Thus, the extent to which they see the international organization
as salient to their cause is very important as the first hypothesis suggests. They use the
EU  in  their  discourse  in  order  to  motivate  their  constituencies  and  acquire  their
support.  For example,  TÜRK-İŞ,  whose members’  interests are in opposition to EU’s
privatization  policy,  appeals  to  the  EU  by  criticizing  its  policies.  This  way,  the
organization  promotes  its  members’  interests  and  tries  to  reverse  the  state’s  EU
harmonization policy.  DİSK and HAK-İŞ  are both pro-EU. DİSK appeals to the EU to
change Turkish social policies and uses the EU as leverage against the state, while HAK-
İŞ  appeals to the EU, supporting the government’s position because its interests and
those  of  the  government  are  mostly  congruent.  DİSK and HAK-İŞ  also  plan for  the
future of their relations with the EU and make use of the financial sources that the EU
programs provide. For the employee organizations, gaining domestic legitimacy is the
most important motivation to appeal to the EU. For the EU supporting organizations,
improving their relations with the European institutions is the second most important
motivator.  For  the  anti-EU  TÜRK-İŞ,  international  prestige  has  recently  become  a
priority, since the organizations started to soften its anti-European stance. 
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115 These  reasons  are  also  consistent  with  each  organizations’  place  in  the  Turkish
economic  and  political  scene.  Suffered  greatly  from  the  closeness  of  the  domestic
environment and failed to become active within the confines that were enforced upon
them, trade unions still struggle to be influential in the domestic arena, and emphasize
their  domestic  prestige.  Thus,  the  relative  openness  of  the  environment,  that  this
work’s second hypothesis focuses on, is an important factor in domestic organizations’
appeal to international allies, a factor that other studies do not emphasize.
116 Tracing the transformation of the domestic environment and its effects on interactions
between domestic actors, the state, and international organizations, this study aims to
add some nuance the  explanations  providing by the  boomerang and spiral  models.
Turkish- EU relations are complex and Turkish domestic actors’ interactions with the
EU  and  the  state  depend  on  many  variables,  such  as  the  history  of  political  and
organizational structures. A historical analysis of these complex relations enables us to
deepen our understanding of the domestic actors’ motives and behaviors, and therefore
this  approach  can  tell  us  more  about  the  reasons  for  the  models’  consistency  or
inconsistency with other cases. 
117 These  findings  indicate  that  the  transnationalist  literature’s  explanation  of  why
domestic organizations appeal to international organizations remains limited.  Being
weak under a repressive state cannot alone explain why domestic organizations appeal
to  international  organizations.  Turkish  domestic  organizations  behave  very
instrumentally, and use the EU as a tool to legitimize their own standing or improve
their own conditions. 
118 Using  a  theoretical  framework  of  the  transnationalist  literature  and  refining  the
boomerang and spiral  models’  hypotheses,  this research attempts to do two things.
First, it focuses on transnational activism. Although the theoretical frame here is not
directly involved with the organizations’  transnational activism understood as their
activities  beyond  their  borders,  this  research  shows  the  importance  of  domestic
conditions for  transnational  relations.  Second,  focusing on the Turkish trade union
confederations’ interaction with the Turkish state and their European counterparts, it
shows the linkages between the organizations’ internal setting and Turkey’s domestic
environment.  It  shows  how  perceptions  of  the  European  Union  affect  Turkey’s
domestic arena. Thus, for further research it would be interesting to see whether other
types of domestic actors’ behaviors vis-à-vis the EU. For example, do the human rights
organizations, on which the transnationalist literature focuses a lot, appeal to the EU in
Turkey? Preliminary findings suggest that Turkish human rights organizations tend to
behave very much like the employees groups.5
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NOTES
1. Keck and Sikkink (1998) look at Argentinean human rights groups in 1970s, Lutz and Sikkink
(2000) apply the boomerang model to Latin American countries, so does Armbruster- Sandoval
(2003) to Honduras’ labor organization. Fleay (2006) explains the Sino-Australian relations on
human rights issue with the help of the spiral model. 
2. For a  comprehensive discussion of  how KESK was founded,  and how its  relations with its
European counterparts developed, see Emre Öngün, Action collective transnationale et contraints de
l’espace national : Enquête sur les formes de l’engagement en Turquie dans le contexte de l’europeanisation,
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(unpublished Ph.D. diss.,  Université Aix-Marseille III- Paul Cézanne Ecole doctoral de Sciences
juridiques et publiques, 2008). 
3. Surely,  European  trade  unions  cannot  be  taken  as  a  static  homogenous  entity,  yet  DİSK,
contrary  to  the  other  Turkish  unions  studied  here  is  much  more  in  line  with  its  European
counterparts and ETUC. 
4. DİSK’s Brussels representation is headed by Yücel Top, who has been very influential in the
Turkish trade union movements’ international linkages. This one man representation is actually
an ironic story in Turkey’s democratization history. As Öngün (2008) points out, Top had to flee
from the 1980 coup and lived in Europe since then,  establishing contacts  with his  European
colleagues there. 
5. Two human rights organizations that have been under strong pressure from the
state as well as from some parts of the society were added to the sample. Organization
for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUM-DER) and Human
Rights Association (IHD) are both advocates of civil and political liberties. MAZLUM-
DER strongly opposes to the ban on the head-scarf, which is a sensitive issue for the
staunch Kemalist secularists in Turkey, and IHD is mainly organized in Southeastern
Turkey and a supporter of better human rights for Kurds. Being under stronger
pressure, these two organizations would be expected to appeal most to the EU. This did
not hold true. MAZLUM-DER sees the EU as a potential force on the state, but the
organization is keen on stressing the importance of internal dynamics, Turkish civil
society’s liveliness. MAZLUM-DER uses the EU in its appeal very instrumentally as well.
After the European Human Rights Court’s rejection of Leyla Sahin’s case, a medical
student who wanted to continue her education wearing the headscarf although it is not
legal to do so, MAZLUM-DER started not to appeal to the European Union on this issue,
but continues to use the EU in its discourse on issues such as the military’s role in
Turkish politics. As for IHD, the organization is very supportive of the EU’s approach to
civil society in general, and of the harmonization process. As one representative
argues, ‘After 1999 both the clashes in the region and the pressure of the State on us
have decreased. State started not to arrest us or not to take us into custody’ (Diken
2006). The IHD’s strength does not come from its appeal to the EU as a leverage tool,
however. Rather, it is the EU’s support of the IHD that puts pressure on the State. 
ABSTRACTS
The boomerang and spiral models argue that domestic groups that are repressed by their states
would seek international allies to help them affect their states’ policies in favor of their own
agenda.  While  these  models  explain  the  level  of  interconnectedness  between  domestic  and
international politics, and trace a framework that helps us study the transnational interactions
between  different  actors,  using  “weak/strong”  dichotomy  to  explain  the  domestic  actors’
position within the national realm prevents us from understanding the changing dynamics of
state-domestic actor- international organization relations. Arguing that the perception of the
international  ally,  that  may change across  time,  and the  levels  of  closeness  of  the  domestic
environment are factors that affect these relations, this paper focuses on three Turkish trade
union confederations’ appeal to the European Union since they started interacting with their
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European counterparts (since the 1960s). The research finds that the trade unions’ using of the
EU as a “stick” against the government depends on their own organizational position since their
EU perceptions change according to the domestic environment. 
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